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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the simultaneous operation of an emissions trading scheme 
(ETS)  and  the  expanded  Mandatory  Renewable  Energy  Target  (MRET)  in  Australia. 
Focussing on the electricity generation sector, I seek to answer the question as to whether 
MRET can be regarded as complementary or in conflict with an ETS. A brief overview of 
the expanded MRET and the likely form of an ETS is given, the latter comparing the two 
key climate change mitigation policy initiatives:  The Garnaut Climate Change Review 
and  the  Commonwealth‘s  Carbon  Pollution  Reduction  Scheme  Green  Paper.  The 
pervasive normative bias in favour of coal in both documents is highlighted. 
A range of key economic interactions between the two policy instruments are evaluated. 
An  important  conclusion  is  that  electricity  prices  are  subject  to  three  complex 
counteracting influences: MRET‘s downwards pressure on ETS permit prices while ETS 
permits  simultaneously  exert  upwards  pressure  on  fossil  fuel  generation  costs,  and 
MRET‘s additional cost impost on electricity retailers. 
The  importance  of  systemic  interactions  in  technological  innovation  is  examined, 
highlighting the barriers to entry for renewable energy represented by incumbent fossil 
fuel dominance. A crucial and perhaps surprising finding is that a carbon price signal 
alone  is  insufficient  to  stimulate  structural  change  in  energy  technologies  due  to  the 
‗locked-in‘ nature of existing fossil fuel generation technologies and their enabling social 
and  institutional  context.  Other  complementary  policy  mechanisms  are  needed 
throughout the ‗innovation chain‘. 
I further discuss the political nature of policy instruments such as the ETS and MRET, 
and examine the implications of a full rendering of the Precautionary Principle. A key 
argument is that an over-reliance on coal and the promise of geosequestration can be 
tempered by policies such as MRET. 
On balance, I conclude that MRET is indeed necessary and is complementary to an ETS. 
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1  Introduction 
1.1  Scope 
The work to follow is focussed on electricity generation within the domestic Australian 
stationary  energy  sector.  While  of  great  importance  to  the  eventual  outcomes  in  this 
sector, many complexities of ETS operation cannot be considered in the space afforded.  
To highlight but two, the role of international scheme linkages and of domestic offsets, 
and  their  respective  eligibility  criteria,  may  radically  alter  the  form  and  evolution  of 
Australia‘s  transition  to  a  carbon-constrained  economy.  A  basic  knowledge  of  the 
function of emissions trading is also assumed. 
1.2  Research Objectives 
This  dissertation  examines  the  interactions  and  policy  implications  arising  from  the 
simultaneous operation of an ETS and an expanded MRET. The objective of this research 
is to address the following questions: 
  Should the expanded MRET be regarded as complementary or in conflict with the 
ETS, and on what basis? 
  What  are  the  major  interactions  between  these  two  policy  instruments?  In 
particular: 
o  Impact on abatement costs 
o  Electricity price effects 
o  Effect on ETS permit price and the abatement effort 
o  Facilitation of long term structural change 
  What  are  the  combined  political  implications  of  these  instruments  and  their 
enabling policy frameworks? 
1.3  Methodology 
This dissertation is based on a critical analysis of relevant documents from Government 
and regulatory authority sources, industry reports and analysis, and the general policy   2 
literature. Of particular importance are the Garnaut Review  (Garnaut 2008b) and the 
CPRS Green Paper (Department of Climate Change 2008a) (see section 4). 
The information collected from these sources has been assessed to determine the form 
and context of an ETS and an expanded MRET, as well as an understanding of the 
principles and lessons from empirical evaluation contained in relevant policy literature. 
Independent reasoning has been applied to this  combined  knowledge to arrive at  the 
perspectives and conclusions presented throughout this dissertation. 
1.4  A note regarding ontology 
This is not an economic assessment. Although economic perspectives play a key role and 
are  evaluated  in  detail  in  certain  sections,  this  is  an  assessment  of  public  policy,  its 
instruments, and their implementation. Policy-making must involve more than economic 
considerations alone, despite the importance of issues such as least cost and efficiency. 
What‘s more, where relevant I write in the first person. This is a deliberate choice so as to 
make clear that, like any policy document, my perspectives are informed by political and 
cultural positions, both explicit and unconscious. Policy instruments are not politically 
‗neutral‘; they express sociopolitical choices and this function must be recognised in any 
policy analysis. While I strive to be as objective as possible, there are three fundamental 
normative  positions  that  form  the  ontological  basis  of  my  perspective  and  hence 
inherently influence my work: 
1.  Climate change is the greatest threat to human civilisation, and to the ecosphere 
on which that depends, that humanity has ever faced. 
2.  Fossil  fuel  consumption  is  the  root  cause  of  the  significant  majority  of 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and those emissions must be curtailed 
radically and urgently. 
3.  Advanced renewable energy systems are the most viable long-term sustainable 
option  for  humanity‘s  energy  requirements,  as  non-renewable  fossil  fuels 
inherently  produce  greenhouse  gases  in  their  energy-release  function  and  are 
subject to physical depletion.   3 
2  Background and context 
2.1  Emissions trading 
The collective task of our times is to mitigate and adapt to anthropogenic climate change; 
in economic terms, to internalise the negative externalities of greenhouse gas emissions 
(GHGs). A carbon price1 is now clearly regarded as the preeminent policy mechanism in 
service of that aim. By facilitating a price on carbon, an emissions trading scheme (ETS) 
will finally redress ‗the greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever seen‘ (Stern 2006, 
i). The conceptual foundation for tradeable property rights of this form was laid out by 
Pigou in 1920, then developed further by Coase in the 1960s — ‗the basic theory ... has 
been established for almost four decades‘ (Hepburn 2007, 376). 
The  primary  advantages  of  a  cap-and-trade  ETS  policy  instrument  over  carbon  tax 
regimes  or  strict  command-and-control  regulation  are  twofold:  under  conditions  of 
uncertainty, an ETS sets the emissions cap directly, allowing the market to determine 
how that cap is reached; and the trading of emission permits in this manner is regarded 
by economists as being the ‗least cost‘ economy-wide abatement mechanism. Further, the 
carbon  price  signal,  rising  as  the  emissions  cap  tightens,  progressively  changes  the 
profitability  of  certain  production  processes,  inducing  shifts  towards  low-emission 
alternatives. In the electricity sector, renewable energy and carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) systems are expected to become increasingly competitive with conventional fossil 
fuel technologies, ultimately replacing them. 
Yet  emissions  trading  is  not  without  its  flaws.  Its  complexity  leaves  it  vulnerable  to 
gaming and rent-seeking behaviour by polluting interests, co-opting and manipulating 
the  regulatory  process.  An  ETS  is  likely  to  involve  substantial  administrative  and 
transaction costs. And it remains unproven in practice. Indeed, the world‘s largest ETS to 
date in the European Union has driven little real abatement, and the free allocation of 
permits  delivered  windfall  profits  to  existing  polluters  with  no  substantive  benefit 
(Garnaut 2008a, 32-3; Hepburn 2007, 381-3). Moreover, the US sulphur dioxide (SO2) 
                                                             
1 As carbon dioxide (and other carbon-based gases) is the principal contributor to climate change, and GHGs 
are by convention represented in terms of their ‘carbon dioxide equivalence’, internalisation of the negative 
social costs of climate change is commonly referred to as a carbon price.   4 
ETS, created to combat acid rain caused by coal-fired electricity generation and vaunted 
as the archetypal example of a successful scheme, has been sharply criticised for allegedly 
reducing emissions at greater cost than regulation would have, and that the changes that 
did occur were likely the result of unrelated structural shifts (such as fuel-switching2) that 
had begun prior to scheme introduction (Lohmann 2006; Driesen 2009 (forthcoming)). 
The ontological and normative implications of emissions trading must also be recognised. 
Driesen (2009 (forthcoming)) argues that an ETS is the policy instrument of choice of the 
neoliberal political worldview and free  market ideology, because it submits  the vitally 
important  policy  goal  of  mitigation  to  the  forces  of  the  market.  Moreover,  ETS 
proponents implicitly assume that such markets are ‗perfectible entities‘ that necessarily 
produce the required abatement outcomes (Healy and Kuch 2008, 6). Indeed, Driesen 
points out that the rejection of command-and-control measures, which are aimed directly 
at desired structural changes, fails to appreciate that regulation  also puts an effective 
price  on  emissions  (because  failure  to  comply  incurs  a  financial  cost)  and  produces 
markets in the requisite technologies (pp. 30, 32). 
 
2.2  The Mandatory Renewable Energy Target 
The  existing  Mandatory  Renewable  Energy  Target  (MRET)  —  established  by  the 
Renewable  Energy  (Electricity)  Act  2000  —  obliges  liable  parties  to  obtain  a  set 
proportion of annual electricity purchases from credited renewable sources, such that an 
additional  9500  GWh/yr  is  collectively  sourced  from  renewables  by  2010  (Tambling 
2003, 2-3). The annual proportion is set by the Renewable Power Percentage (RPP) — as 
defined in the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Regulations 2001 — such that each liable 
party  must  obtain  RPP%  of  its  total  electricity  purchases  from  renewables.  RRPs 
increased annually from scheme commencement. RRPs are specified to 2008 only with a 
final value of 3.14% (§ 23 part 4, Commonwealth of Australia 2007). MRET is national in 
scope, applying to electricity grids greater than 100 MW capacity, where liable parties are 
                                                             
2 Fuel switching to low-sulphur coal had already begun because new sources coming online were actually 
cheaper.   5 
in general large wholesale purchasers of electricity such as electricity retailers and certain 
industrial entities (ORER 2008a, 1). 
In order to demonstrate compliance, liable parties  must annually obtain and surrender 
Renewable  Energy  Certificates  (REC ).  Each  REC  represents  1  MWh  of  renewable 
generation,  created  by  generators  accredited  by  the  Office  of  the  Renewable  Energy 
Regulator  (ORER).  RECs  are  bankable,  tradeable,  have  no  expiration  date,  and  are 
terminated upon surrender  (Tambling 2003, 3). Failure to comply  incurs a  shortfall 
charge of $40/MWh (subject to a 10% leeway), which is redeemable up to 3 years if 
shortfalls are made up (Tambling 2003, 4; ORER 2008a, 3). Importantly, the shortfall 
charge is not indexed to inflation, hence declining in real terms over time. Further, it is 
not tax deductible, which effectively means that liable parties would normally be willing 
to pay closer to $57/REC (Sonneborn 2004, 1803). 
RECs are sold on both spot and bilateral contract markets. The bilateral market is the 
main game  however, comprising some  80% of total volume,  while the spot market is 
commonly regarded as a residual compliance market, supplying liabilities not covered by 
contracts and generally at lower prices (McLennan Magasanik Associates 2007b, 18, 31). 
2.2.1  REC sources 
The relative proportion of RECs generated from the various eligible renewable sources 
has varied significantly over the scheme‘s course. As of 2006, wind was the largest source 
at 46% (up from 6% in 2001), followed by solar water heaters (SWH) at 27% (up from 
13%), with lesser contributions from bagasse, landfill gas, and wood waste (McLennan 
Magasanik  Associates  2007b,  17).  Hydroelectric‘s  contribution  has  fluctuated 
dramatically from a high of some 60% in 2003 dropping to only 3% in 2006, reflecting 
variability in the water resource. 
The eligibility of SWH, the only non electricity generating source,  is something of an 
anomaly. SWH are deemed eligible due to their displacement of electric water heaters, 
thereby reducing emissions from fossil fuel generation (ORER 2008b). This is something 
of a distortion of MRET‘s primary purpose of encouraging renewable energy, and each   6 
SWH installation certainly cannot be guaranteed to displace electric water heaters nor 
guarantee that any displaced electricity necessarily came from fossil fuels. 
2.2.2  REC prices 
REC prices logically reflect the relative scarcity of RECs subject to market supply and 
demand.  In  the  principal  context  of  renewable  electricity,  REC  prices  represent  the 
difference  between  the  marginal  renewable  generator‘s  costs  and  the  wholesale 
electricity price received (Garnaut 2008b, 354; Outhred and MacGill 2003, 4).  The REC 
‗provides the subsidy, in addition to the electricity price, that is required to recover all 
costs  including  investment  costs  of  the  last  installed  (marginal)  renewable  energy 
generator required to meet the REC target‘ (McLennan Magasanik Associates 2007b, 21). 
However, the eligibility of SWH means that the long term REC price (within the shortfall 
cap constraint) is set by the marginal renewable generator or by the price required to 
increase SWH sales, whichever is lowest (pg. 28). 
It could therefore be argued that SWH prices tend to act as an entry cost threshold for 
new renewable generators, because if their costs exceed SWH prices they may not receive 
REC revenues to cover them. 
An industry participant advised in late October 2008 that the current REC spot price is 
$44. 
 
2.3  Electricity sector 
Estimates vary, but in 2005-06, total Australian electricity generation was around 220 
TWh, of which about 7.6% was from renewable energy sources (6.4% from hydroelectric 
alone) (Commonwealth of Australia 2008, 39-40).   7 
 
Figure  1  -  2005-06  Australian  electricity  generation  by  fuel  (Commonwealth  of 
Australia 2008, 40) 
 
In 2005-06, Australian GHG emissions totalled 576 Mt CO2-eq, 50% of this from the 
stationary energy sector; another 6% is from fugitive emissions, the bulk being in coal 
mining  (Department  of  Climate  Change  2008c,  3,  8).  68.9%  of  stationary  energy 
emissions are produced in electricity generation — at 34.5%, the largest single contributor 
to  the  Australian  total  under  the  rules  employed  by  Department  of  Climate  Change  
(2008a) — with the sector increasing from 1990 by 53% (pg. 7).  
 
 
Figure  2  -  Historical  emissions  from  electricity  generation,  1990-2006;  total 
Australian emissions 2006 (Fig 6 & Fig 1,Department of Climate Change 2008c, 7, 3) 
   8 
2.4  Wholesale electricity markets 
Wholesale electricity markets are a particularly important focal point for both the ETS 
and MRET‘s impacts on the electricity sector. It is in these markets that key price effects 
from both schemes first manifest. An appreciation of the wholesale market‘s price-setting 
function is required for a full understanding of these schemes‘ implications and this is 
outlined  below.  The  National  Electricity  Market  (NEM),  covering  Queensland,  NSW, 
Victoria,  SA,  and  Tasmania,  operates  a  wholesale  electricity  ‗spot  market‘  broadly  as 
described  (NEMMCO  2008).  The  Wholesale  Electricity  Market  of  Western  Australia 
(WEM) does employ a market trading mechanism, but the bulk of energy and capacity 
trades occur via bilateral contracts, so price effects are likely to vary from this description.  
In ‗liberalised‘ wholesale electricity markets the system operator dynamically dispatches 
generators to meet demand using a ‗merit order‘ determined by each generator‘s offer 
price, such that lowest cost generators are dispatched first. That offer price is based on 
individual generators‘ short run marginal cost (SRMC), which incorporates all variable 
costs of operation as well as avoidable fixed plant startup and shutdown costs (McHugh 
2008, 10-1). The spot price for the half-hour period is then the offer price of the most 
expensive  generator  dispatched,  and  all  dispatched  generators  receive  this  price;  this 
marginal profit may be well in excess of their offer price. In this way, the most marginal 
generator serves as the price maker, and is commonly peaking gas-fired plant (Foxon et 
al. 2007, 47-8; Department of Climate Change 2008a, 348-50). Baseload in Australia is 
predominantly supplied by coal-fired generators.  
Price formation in a wholesale market is illustrated below.   9 
 
Figure 3 - Margins earned by coal generators when spot price set by gas plant (Fig 
10.1, Department of Climate Change 2008a, 349) 
 
Crucially,  under  these  conditions,  renewable  generators  —  due  to  their  largely  non-
schedulable3  nature  and  near zero  SRMC  —  are  highly  unlikely  to  be  the  marginal 
dispatched plant and hence are almost always price takers (Foxon et al. 2007, 47-8). 
   
                                                             
3 Although, geothermal, biomass, and, to a lesser extent, solar thermal and hydroelectric plants can reasonably 
be regarded as schedulable.   10 
3  The expanded Mandatory Renewable Energy Target 
The  expanded  Renewable  Energy  Target  (RET)4  is being designed by  the Council of 
Australian  Government‘s  (COAG)  Working  Group  on  Climate  Change  and  Water.  An 
options paper was released on 2nd July 2008, with a submission period extending to July 
31st (Department of Climate Change 2008b). The final expanded RET design was due to 
be tabled at COAG‘s October 2008 meeting; however the meeting‘s formal communiqué 
and  website  make  no  mention  of  it  whatsoever,  and  requests  to  the  COAG  unit  to 
determine the RET design‘s status remain unanswered at time of writing. 
The specific form of the RET is therefore not yet known.  However, the two design options 
proposed by COAG are outlined below. For the purposes of the current analysis both 
options would have largely similar effects, although final treatment of the shortfall charge 
(especially any phase-out mechanism) would alter the price effect dynamics discussed in 
section 5.4. 
The federal Government has committed to an expanded RET that (COAG 2008, 4): 
  Would commence from 2010 
  Ensures ‗at least‘ (pg. 4) 20% of national electricity supply will be sourced from 
renewables  by  2020  through  an  increased  RET  of  45  TWh  per  year,  in 
combination with existing supply of around 15 TWh per year 
  Consolidates the existing MRET and all State-based targets 
  Retains the same eligibility criteria as MRET 
  Will be phased out between 2020-2030 as the ETS matures and electricity prices 
reflect the carbon cost 
 
An important and apparently unanswered question in the design is whether the expanded 
RET would be enacted as a percentage target as the MRET is (annual RPP) or in terms of 
specified aggregate generation. If a percentage target is used then, under the influence of 
                                                             
4 While not stated explicitly, the implication is that the expanded MRET scheme will be renamed to simply RET. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, RET and MRET are used interchangeably.   11 
an ETS, 20% of total electricity generated in 2020 may be significantly less than the 
combined 60 TWh. 
3.1  Two design options 
COAG  is  considering  two  design  approaches  (COAG  2008,  13-18).  Both  approaches 
incorporate a review in 2015 with possible target adjustments, and generators accredited 
before Jan 2008 would be unable to generate RECs after 2020, allegedly so as to prevent 
windfall gains to incumbents. 
Approach 1 is closely based on the existing MRET; has a least-cost renewable uptake 
goal;  provides  strong  investment  incentive  early  in  the  scheme  and  encourages  early 
creation of RECs to help minimise REC prices (through banking).  Specific features of 
Approach 1: 
  Lowers cost through REC market liquidity, in part due to continued eligibility of 
SWH 
  Has high initial annual targets from 2010 but would increase at a lower rate in 
the early years before increasing pace to 2020 
  Shortfall charge would be set above the projected maximum REC price and is not 
indexed to inflation 
  Two options for scheme phase-out: 
o  Option  1:  reducing  shortfall  charge  from  2025  to  2030,  allegedly 
enabling the 45 TWh/yr target to be maintained from 2020-2030 
o  Option 2: fixed shortfall charge for scheme duration but annual targets 
are reduced; this may lead to generation less than 45 TWh/yr by 2020 
Approach 1 is illustrated below.   12 
 
Figure 4 - RET Approach 1, showing phase-out Option 1 (Fig 3.1, COAG 2008, 14) 
 
 
Figure 5 - RET Approach 1, showing phase-out Option 2 (Fig 3.2, COAG 2008, 15) 
 
Approach 2 balances the objective of least-cost with the risk that 45 TWh is not actually 
being generated in 2020 (due to banking); it ‗seeks to encourage a smoother investment   13 
profile to help bring forward new technologies in the latter part of the scheme‘ (pg. 13). 
Specific features of Approach 1: 
  REC  market  liquidity  is  achieved  through  allowing  long  participation  times; 
however, time periods for REC generation and banking are limited 
  The annual target profile rises from 2010 to 45 TWh/yr by 2020, then declines 
from 2025 at the same rate as the rise from 2010 — this reflects the proposed 15 
yr project eligibility period 
  SWH would be phased out as eligible generators to 2020 and then excluded 
  Shortfall charges would be similar to Approach 1 (but are not stated), seeking to 
‗encourage the relevant liability every year to be met through surrendering RECs 
rather than paying the shortfall charge‘ (pg. 17) 
Approach 2 is illustrated below. 
 
Figure 6 - RET Approach 2 (Fig 3.3, COAG 2008, 16) 
 
     14 
4  An Australian ETS and policy framework 
Two  initiatives  are  central  to  the  definition  and  design  of  an  ETS  and  accompanying 
policy  framework  in  Australia:  The  Garnaut  Climate  Change  Review  and  the 
Commonwealth Government‘s Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS), currently as 
a Green Paper. Of the two, it is reasonable to conclude that the Green Paper indicates the 
probable direction of Government policy as it is directly produced by the Department of 
Climate Change, and because Minister Wong has publicly stated that Garnaut is now just 
one ‗input‘ into the design process. 
Garnaut‘s Final Report and the Green Paper each exceed 500 pages, so only a summary of 
the major relevant points can be provided here. 
 
4.1  Common recommendations 
In  general  terms  both  Garnaut  and  the  Green  Paper  contain  the  following 
recommendations: 
  A  cap-and-trade  ETS  to  begin  in  2010,  with  some  form  of  price  limit  for  the 
initial  ‗transitional‘  period  to  2014/15,  the  end  of  the  Kyoto  Protocol    (Green 
Paper via price caps, Garnaut via fixed prices) 
  Emission  permits  representing  1  tonne  CO2-eq  covering  6  GHGs  (see 
GLOSSARY) 
  Initial  scheme  coverage  to  include  stationary  energy,  transport,  industrial 
processes, fugitive emissions, and waste sectors; forestry sector would be opt-in 
under CPRS but initially excluded by Garnaut 
  A primary permit allocation mechanism with secondary trading market 
  Annual surrender5 of permits to cover emission liability 
  Direct obligation on point of emission (hence fossil fuel electricity generators are 
directly liable) 
                                                             
5 Garnaut did not specify annual compliance periods but this is within the range suggested.   15 
  Domestic offsets from non-covered sectors and linkage to similar international 
markets (including international offset credits) 
  Intertemporality measures, including permit banking (potentially unlimited) 
  Redistribution of permit revenues to households and businesses in order to assist 
in the adjustment process 
  Assistance to Emissions-Intensive Trade-Exposed industries (EITEs)  
  Complementary policy efforts to address other market failures 
  Transitional assistance measures, particularly R&D and development funding for 
low emission technologies 
 
4.2  Points of departure 
There are some stark differences between the two initiatives however, essentially related 
to impacts on the worst polluting industries. In this the Green Paper  makes so many 
concessions, accommodations, and dispensations that  realisation of the ETS‘s goals of 
least-cost abatement or environmental effectiveness may be seriously compromised. 
Where Garnaut makes clear that the only fair, effective, and non-distortionary method for 
allocating  emission  permits  is  100%  auctioning,  the  Green  Paper  argues  for  free 
allocation to EITEs and ‗Strongly Affected Industries‘ (SAIs), at least initially. Garnaut 
points out that free allocation undermines the policy objective of abatement, encourages 
rent-seeking  and  lobbying  behaviour,  and  ‗safeguards  the  profits  of  the  fortunate 
recipients while imposing even greater adjustment costs on other emitters and on the 
community‘ (2008b, pp. 314-5). It also has no effect whatever on consumer prices as 
firms simply pass on the opportunity cost of not on-selling any freely allocated permits, 
giving them windfall profits as demonstrated by the EU ETS (2008a, pp. 32-3). 
But the most fundamental difference from Garnaut is the Green Paper‘s largesse toward 
SAIs  —  those  emissions-intensive  industries  with  significant  sunk  costs  that  ‗face  a 
reduction  in  their  profitability‘  and  consequent  ‗large  reduction  in  their  asset  values‘, 
because production cost increases cannot fully be passed on to consumers (pp. 341-5).   16 
Electricity generation, and especially coal, are listed as the prime instance of an SAI. 
Astoundingly,  coal-generators‘  lack  of  ‗significant  economically  viable  abatement 
opportunities‘  and  resultant  loss  of  market  share  to  less  emission-intensive 
competitiveness is given as a further reason for assistance (pp. 348-51). This is without 
doubt compensation to the worst polluters. 
The Green Paper goes yet farther still. On top of general SAI assistance measures, coal 
generators  in  particular  are  to  receive  direct  financial  assistance  and  specific 
programmes dedicated to developing CCS (pp. 355-70). This direct assistance is allegedly 
justified on grounds of energy security and supply reliability, ‗fairness‘, and especially the 
negative effect on the investment climate caused by the ETS.  
Garnaut  (2008b)  repeatedly  and  unambiguously  rejects  any  such  compensatory 
measures,  specifically  labelling  the  very  arguments  employed  by  the  Green  Paper6  as 
‗false‘ (pp. 396-7). Garnaut points out that there is neither tradition nor precedent for 
compensating firms for losses or gains resulting from economic reform (pp. 315-6); any 
similar payments to EITEs are about the lack of international carbon constraints, not 
compensating a loss in profit or asset value (pp. 344-5). What‘s more, the concept of a 
negative effect on investment climate is unjustifiable. Garnaut highlights that policy risk 
is not ‗sovereign risk‘ and is hence a normal fact of life for market participants, and policy 
changes  that  affect  asset  values  ‗are  not  unusual‘;  the  industry  has  been  aware  of  a 
pending carbon price ‗for some time‘; the ‗Government does not, as a matter of course, 
compensate asset owners  when  environmental or social externalities are internalised‘; 
and where some investors may be deterred, a clear climate change mitigation response 
will attract others (pp. 396-7). 
It should be noted that compensation is distinct from structural adjustment assistance for 
affected workers, communities, and regions, which are supported in varying ways by both 
Garnaut and the Green Paper. 
 
 
                                                             
6 Yet Garnaut does not actually make any link to the Green Paper.   17 
Box 1: Countering perverse arguments for compensation 
The Green Paper’s compensation measures are largely sophistry, a thinly veiled political argument 
for acceding to lobbying pressure. As many commentators have noted, the coal industry can now 
look forward to both free permits and direct ‘assistance’, making the CPRS ‘as much a handout 
bonanza for our biggest polluters as it is an emissions trading scheme’ (Kean 2008). The painful 
lessons of the EU ETS first Phases have not been learned. In their submission to Garnaut’s ETS 
discussion paper, University of NSW researchers bluntly state that arguments for compensation 
due to negative impact on investor confidence ‘have the matter the wrong way around’, effectively 
penalising  investors  who  assumed  good  governance  would  be  forthcoming  and  changed  their 
investment portfolios accordingly (emphasis added, MacGill and Betz 2008, 15). After all, investors 
have known the carbon price was coming since at least 1992 when Australia signed the UN Rio 
Declaration  (pg.  14).  Other  researchers  have  shown  in  general  terms  that  the  implications  of 
political  actions  such  as  these  have  a  strong  influence  on  the strategic  investment  climate  (as 
policy risk) (Foxon et al. 2007, 53). And loss of market share for the worst polluting sources in 
Australia should be the whole point of an effective ETS. 
 
4.3  All about coal 
If  one  theme  stands  out  in  both  documents  it  is  that  our  energy  future  and  national 
interest lies with coal, and carbon capture and storage (CCS) will be the saviour of the 
industry. The Green Paper is especially redolent in this regard, for example stating that 
‗[c]oal is the most plentiful and broadly distributed energy source on the planet‘ (pg. 29) 
— evidently the immensely greater abundance of solar energy does not factor into this 
perspective. 
Despite recognising that an ETS should rightfully result in ‗winners and losers‘ (pg. 80), 
the  Green  Paper  makes  much  of  Australia‘s  role  as  the  4th  largest  coal  producer  and 
largest exporter, and that maintaining this is firmly in the national interest (eg, pg. 356). 
Time  and  again  the  Green  Paper  extols  the  virtues  for  CCS  and  proposes  yet  more   18 
funding7, where it could instead have pushed for renewable  energy alternatives with at 
least equal force. 
Garnaut‘s (2008b) discussion of technology innovation refers far more to CCS and its 
value  for  coal  exports  than  renewables.  Again  and  again  the  opportunity  to  at  least 
balance the picture with recognition of the national interest inherent in the great energy 
and export potential for renewable technologies goes begging (for example, pp. 31-2). 
Chapter 20 on energy transformation again focuses on coal and CCS, with only minor 
mention of renewables, and even then marginalising them as but ‗intermittent‘. Quite 
amazingly, Garnaut sees not only a continuing future for brown coal — the dirtiest of all 
fossil fuels — but even an expansion of it for domestic consumption and for export (pp. 
392,  474).  All  in  all  this  is  a  rather  glaring  case  of  picking  winners,  given  Garnaut‘s 
exhortations to avoid doing so, discussed below. 
The normative position deeply embedded in both policy documents is as unambiguous as 
it is unable to vision alternative realities. This position is examined in section 6.3. 
 
4.4  Positions regarding MRET 
The Green Paper says little about the expanded MRET other than to note its existence. 
There  is  no  discussion  of  its  role  as  a  complementary  policy  mechanism  nor  of  any 
conflict with the ETS.  A minor reference is made to the Ministerial Council on Energy 
commissioning a review of ‗energy market frameworks‘ in light of the introduction of the 
ETS and expanded MRET. No position statement is presented. However, as the expanded 
MRET is current Government policy, the implication is that it will be implemented. 
 
Garnaut  does  discuss  the  expanded  MRET  and  takes  the  explicit  position  —  initially 
under the heading ‗Pandering to pet solutions‘ — that it ‗will not address any additional 
market  failures‘  because,  in  his  view,  it  functions  only  as  an  ‗additional  emissions 
                                                             
7 Estimates of existing direct and indirect State and Commonwealth subsidies to the fossil fuel industries total at 
least $6b/yr and may be greater than $9b/yr (Diesendorf 2007, 289-91).   19 
reduction measure‘, and that its ‗potentially distorting effects can  be  phased  out‘  (pg. 
317). Seemingly without any intended sense of irony, Garnaut then counsels governments 
to  not  ‗pick  winners‘  and  instead  ‗fix  market  failures‘,  avoiding  ‗policies  that  skew 
investment decisions towards technologies that are currently in favour‘ (pp. 317-8). Such 
statements are rather strangely at odds with the predilection for the continued use of coal 
and  the  explicit  support  for  CCS  that  pepper  the  review.  Most  importantly,  Garnaut 
appears to have failed to appreciate the vital function that a mechanism like MRET plays 
in fostering technological innovation, detailed in section 6. 
4.4.1  Garnaut’s analysis of MRET 
At slightly under 3 pages, Garnaut‘s  (2008b) analysis of MRET is not overly detailed (pp. 
353-6). The main points are itemised in Table 1 below; these are addressed directly in 
section 8. 
Table 1 - Garnaut's analysis of MRET implications for ETS 
Item  Description 
GR01.    The expanded MRET would drive increasingly expensive technology 
deployments, both those ‗currently favoured‘ and emerging. REC 
prices would rise as a result, causing higher electricity prices. 
GR02.    The ETS and MRET reflect different policy objectives and operational 
characteristics. The ETS focuses on emission constraints and is 
technology neutral, operating as a competitive market to abate at least 
cost. MRET is technology prescriptive and set by Government. 
GR03.    Simultaneous operation of the two policy instruments ‗will potentially 
be detrimental‘ to electricity producers and consumers alike due to 
their ‗clash of objectives‘. 
GR04.    Reasonable assumptions of the effects of interaction indicate that by 
2020 some 8000 MW of additional renewable capacity (largely wind) 
would displace gas plant, costing an extra $750m-$1.1b per year. 
GR05.    MRET ‗could‘ cause the ‗perverse consequence‘ of additional coal   20 
generation in excess of 2000 MW as gas plants are ‗crowded out‘ by 
renewables. A situation that would not occur under the ETS alone. 
GR06.    If MRET‘s ramp-up rate was ‗aggressive‘8 while the ETS trajectory was 
‗gentle‘, MRET would cause very low permit prices, high REC prices, 
high electricity prices, and little other abatement activity. If the ETS 
trajectory was also ‗aggressive‘, prices become more variable. In both 
situation‘s, MRET is regarded as ‗cannibalising‘ the ETS. 
 
Garnaut (2008b) further argues that if the expanded MRET is to proceed, the existing 
non-indexed  $40/MWh  shortfall  charge  should  be  retained  as  it  provides  the  ‗best 
opportunity for a smooth transition‘ into the broader ETS (pg. 355). The shortfall charge 
is effectively an upper limit on MRET‘s higher costs relative to the ETS. It approximates a 
permit price of $40/t CO2-eq, and as permits rise beyond $40-45 the ETS would ‗come to 
dominate investment decisions and the economic effects of MRET would be subsumed‘ 
within it9 (pg. 355). 
Remarkably, the only external source cited in Garnaut‘s 3 page analysis is a report on the 
implications  of  a  20%  target  from  CRA  International  to  the  Australian  Petroleum 
Production & Exploration Association. Obviously such industry perspectives have a right 
to be heard. But CRA International is notorious for its role in the fossil fuel industries‘ 
lobbying activities and intense efforts to prevent Australian climate change mitigation 
policies (Pearse 2007). The lack of balance here is then greatly concerning, not the least 
of  which  for  the  omission  of  clear  advice  in  MRET‘s  favour  found  in  reports  actually 
commissioned by the review (see section 6.2). 
 
 
   
                                                             
8 The term’s ‘aggressive’ and ‘gentle’ are vague and not defined. However, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that the COAG design options would be regarded by Garnaut as ‘aggressive’. 
9 This approximation is under current conditions and average emission intensity ratio of 1.0 -0.9t CO2-eq/MWh 
for electricity supplied outside of MRET.   21 
5  ETS & MRET: key economic interactions 
This section examines the key economic interactions expected to occur between the ETS 
and expanded MRET over the short to medium term from scheme commencement in 
2010. It is a distillation of analysis and insights from a range of sources, in combination 
with my own interpretation and reasoning. 
5.1  The ETS carbon price signal 
The principal effect of an ETS in the electricity sector is to increase the operational costs 
for fossil fuel generators: each unit of electricity generated now incurs the additional cost 
of the previously unpriced negative externality of GHG emissions, as determined by the 
ETS permit price. This cost can be modelled as a function of the emissions intensity of the 
specific fossil fuel plant ( indicates increasing change). That is: 
 operating cost ($) = emissions intensity (t CO2-eq/MWh) x electricity generated 
(MWh) x permit price ($/t CO2-eq) 
 
However, this cost could be calculated at any point during the liability period; ie, the 
relevant permit price is that determined at the time of permit surrender10.  
This  additional  cost  is  incorporated  into  each  generator‘s  short  run  marginal  costs 
(SRMC), which therefore drives up the wholesale electricity price (see original description 
in  section  2.4).  Different  fossil  fuel  generation  technologies,  and  specific  plants,  have 
significant  variation  in  emissions  intensity,  with  combined  cycle  gas  turbines  (CCGT) 
being the least intensive of existing generation technologies. Hence, SRMC will increase 
by different relative proportions for different fossil fuel generators, with brown coal being 
the greatest and gas the least.  The ETS will therefore induce both changes in the dispatch 
merit order and fuel switching among fossil fuel generators as costs rise asymmetrically, 
with  gas  becoming  progressively  favoured  over  coal.  Figure  7  below  shows  average 
operational  emissions  intensity  by  generation  technology  (CCS  is  of  course  predicted 
only). 
 
                                                             
10 Subject to firms’ usual risk management strategies such as permit banking, derivatives markets, etc.   22 
 
Figure 7 - Emissions intensity of electricity technologies (units changed from kg CO2-
eq/kWh, in Chart 6.24, Australian Federal Treasury 2008, 173)11 
 
The effect on the wholesale electricity market is therefore to increase the market price by 
the relative increase in SRMC of the marginal dispatched generator, again commonly gas. 
As  the  Green  Paper  highlights,  this  SRMC  differential  will  tend  to  reduce  the  profits 
earned by coal generators, as illustrated below: the spot price increases by $Z, the carbon 
cost for the marginal generator, where coal generator‘s carbon costs ($X and $Y) are 
significantly  greater  than  $Z.  However,  it  should  be  noted  that  even  in  this  case  the 
additional revenue received by all generators with SRMC (and hence offer prices) below 
that of the marginal dispatched generator is economic ‗rent‘ — or supernormal profit — 
that  would  not  occur  if  any  such  entity  was  themselves  the  price  setting  marginal 
generator. 
                                                             
11 See GLOSSARY for definition of acronyms.   23 
 
Figure 8 - ETS price effect on wholesale electricity market (Fig 10.2, Department of 
Climate Change 2008a, 350) 
 
5.2  Fungibility 
No scheme design proposals include any form of fungibility or interchangeability between 
RECs  and  emission  permits:  RECs  cannot  be  exchanged  for  permits  nor  directly 
surrendered to meet obligations under the ETS, and vice versa. Further, liable parties 
under  each  scheme  are  separate  and  discrete  entities:  MRET  applies  to  wholesale 
electricity  purchasers  whereas  the  ETS  applies  to  emitters,  which  in  the  electricity 
context  means  fossil  fuel  generators.  Simultaneous  operation  therefore  avoids  the 
situation of double counting (eg, if a REC was also considered a unit of abatement) and 
double coverage (the same party liable twice), which are a risk under policy interaction 
(Oikonomou and Jepma 2008, 147). 
The primary implication of non-fungibility is that the ETS is not compromised by the 
allowance  of  permits  derived  from  non-abatement  activities12. That is, while a REC 
represents renewable energy generation which is of course emission free (at point of use), 
that  generation  is  not  abatement  as  such.  However,  for  a  given  level  of  electricity 
generated  from  a  portfolio  of  plants,  increased  renewable  generation  will  result  in 
reduced  emissions.  This  reduction  has  value  within  the  ETS  as  a  decreased  emission 
                                                             
12 Notwithstanding the presence of domestic and international offsets in the scheme.   24 
liability  for  that  displaced  fossil  fuel  generator.  The  abatement  is  thus  ‗real‘  in  that 
emissions  are  measurably  decreased,  whereas  if  a  REC  could  be  surrendered  directly 
under the ETS it would only represent abatement potential. 
 
5.3  MRET effect on abatement 
To  reiterate:  MRET  and  expanding  renewable  generation  —  both  absolute  and  as  a 
relative  proportion  of  total  electricity  generation  —  does  not  directly  result  in  GHG 
emission  abatement.  This  is  because  renewable  generation  plants  are  separate  from 
existing fossil fuel plants: they are not an incremental or marginal technology addition or 
component replacement within a fossil plant that allows that plant to continue operation 
at reduced emissions intensity. A renewable generator coming online does not in and of 
itself cause emissions to reduce directly because that generator has no immediate effect 
on  emission  sources.  Only  when  any  mandated  increase  in  renewable  generation 
displaces existing and potential fossil plants, causing them to reduce or cease output, 
does abatement occur, and I classify that effect as indirect. Further, only by displacing 
existing  fossil  plant  does  MRET  induce  indirect  abatement:  if  renewable  generation 
comes online to meet some increase in electricity demand, displacing fossil plant that 
may otherwise have provided that capacity, then renewable energy has increased while 
emissions have remained static. 
Moreover,  it  should  not  be  assumed  that  even  a  20%  RET  necessarily  results  in 
displacement  of  existing  fossil  plant.  As  Garnaut  (2008b)  observes,  total  electricity 
demand over time is sensitive to the emissions trajectory, other policy influences, and the 
degree of fuel switching towards electricity  (pp. 355, 468). Some analysts suggest that the 
20% target would equate to only 60% of forecast demand increase in the NEM  (Riesz 
2008)13.  Whatever  the  eventual  proportion,  it  is  a t  least  plausible  that  increase d 
renewable generation induced by MRET causes only minor displacement of existing fossil 
plant, and could potentially displace none at all.  
                                                             
13 It is not clear if this projection included the impact of an ETS however.   25 
So while MRET serves to stimulate structural change away from fossil fuels, reducing  
costs and supporting innovation (see section 6),  it is not a direct abatement instrument. 
5.3.1  Marginal abatement costs 
MRET also has no direct effect on fossil fuel generators‘ marginal abatement costs (MAC) 
under the ETS. This is because, as outlined above, the technology deployments mandated 
by  MRET  do  not  affect  the  emissions  intensity  of  existing  fossil  plants.  Increased 
renewable  generation  has  no  bearing  on  the  ability  or  cost  for  an  existing  fossil  fuel 
generator to reduce their emissions intensity at the margin (reduced emissions for same 
electricity output). Incremental technology change such as fuel washing, boiler efficiency 
improvements,  ultracritical  coal  combustion  techniques,  etc.,  are  simply  unrelated  to 
renewable energy technologies and their level of deployment. 
However, this analysis principally applies to particular fossil fuel generation plants and 
not to the firms that own and operate them per se. If such a firm adopts a  portfolio 
approach to its generation assets, diversifying generation technologies, then the MAC for 
that firm‘s total output as a whole may be affected by MRET. In this scenario, the cost 
reductions  for  renewable  technologies  induced  by  MRET,  in  combination  with  the 
additional REC revenue stream (up to the shortfall cap), may result in a levelised cost for 
equivalent renewable generation that is less than the additional cost for improvements at 
the  margin  of  existing  fossil  fuel  assets.  But  of  course  deploying  new  renewable 
generation  assets  is  a  long  run  investment  decision  for  the  firm,  where  the  MAC  for 
existing assets (as sunk costs) is in the short run. 
5.3.2  Displacement 
A  number  of  analysts  have  noted  that  additional  renewable  generation,  such  as  that 
induced  by  MRET,  will  tend  to  displace  existing  marginal  fossil  fuel  plants  within 
wholesale electricity markets (del Río González 2007; McLennan Magasanik Associates 
2007a; Australian Federal Treasury 2008). Predominantly this will be peaking gas plant 
in Australia, because of their role as the marginal generator, especially at peak demand. 
This occurs because, as explained in section 2.4, renewable generators are almost always 
price takers. Further, they are likely to ‗shadow bid‘ the highest-cost dispatched generator   26 
during the trading interval when renewable energy is available, so as to maximise revenue 
(extending  analysis  in  McLennan  Magasanik  Associates  2007a,  30) .  Hence,  once 
sufficient renewable energy is available, the net result is that renewable generators are 
dispatched  to  meet  the  dynamic  demand  requirements,  thereby  displacin g  more 




In  Figure  9,  the  marginal  peaking  gas  generator  (blue  hatched)  is  displaced  by  a 
renewable  generator  (solid  green)  in  satisfying  the  higher  demand.  This  renewable 
generator has shadow bid the previous highest-cost dispatched generator (solid blue), so 
sells at the same price, Pre. This is of course only one illustrative scenario. Renewable 
generators would offer into the market at a range of price points, not only at the margin 
—  all  else  being  equal,  a  renewable  generator  must  sell  electricity  when  it  can  be 
generated  and  will  simply  take  the  spot  price  available  at  that  time.  Displacement  of 
peaking gas would then occur because, for example, renewable generation was available 
at base or intermediate demand levels, changing the dispatch order of plants other than 









Figure 9 - Renewable generator displaces marginal gas generator   27 
 
5.4  Price effects 
A number of important price effects occur in the electricity sector under the ETS, MRET, 
and their interaction. 
5.4.1  MRET effect on ETS permit price 
If  MRET  induces  sufficient  renewable  generation  to  displace  existing  fossil  fuel 
generators, then the emissions avoided by that displacement serve to reduce the relative 
scarcity of emissions under the ETS. That is, for a given emissions cap, emissions avoided 
due to MRET‘s displacement effect are available to be ‗used‘ by other actors covered by 
the scheme. The volume of emissions ‗available‘ are then higher than would otherwise be 
the case, and so are relatively less scarce. Reduced scarcity is reflected in the ETS by 
dampened permit demand, and hence a reduced permit price. MRET can therefore be 
expected to put downwards pressure on the ETS permit price, at least during the short to 
medium term of scheme operation. After a certain point the emissions cap would be such 
that generators displaced by MRET would not have been able to continue operation in 
their original configuration in any case. 
5.4.2  Effects on electricity prices 
By displacing marginal generators,  increased renewable  generation  would tend to put 
downwards pressure on the wholesale electricity spot price. As can be seen in Figure 9, 
displacement of a marginal gas generator caused the spot price to fall from Pgas to Pre. 
Revenue for all generators operating during that trading interval is then reduced by the 
amount $. Importantly, this effect occurs when renewable generators enter the market 
(they are able to make a normal profit) and is not a function particular to MRET per se. 
Conversely, the ETS price signal increases the wholesale electricity price because fossil 
fuel generators — who dominate the market — pass on their additional operational costs, 
as described in section 5.1. 
Electricity retailers are of course affected by these wholesale price effects. In the absence 
of regulatory price controls, changes in electricity costs would be passed on to consumers.   28 
However, retailers also have the additional cost impost of purchasing RECs to satisfy 
their MRET liability; this REC revenue is of course the parallel mechanism by which 
renewable  generators  cover  operational  costs,  thereby  passing  MRET‘s  costs  on  to 
consumers (del Río González 2007, 1374). Retail electricity prices are therefore subject to 
three interrelated but broadly opposing influences: upwards pressure on wholesale prices 
from  the  ETS,  in  part  counteracted  by  downwards  pressure  from  MRET  on  the  ETS 
permit price itself, combined with the REC price cost impost for retailers.  
In his survey of the policy literature, del Río González (2007) notes that the end result for 
retail electricity prices of the latter two MRET-related influences is ‗ambiguous‘, and that 
the interaction between policies like MRET and an ETS, as described above, ‗is a complex 
one‘ (pp. 1373-4). These complexities are illustrated below. 
 
 
5.4.3  Long run investment decisions 
Electricity  prices  received  by  generators  should  ‗in  principle‘  cover  long  run  marginal 
costs (LRMC) (McLennan Magasanik Associates 2006a, 2). New entrants are then only 
viable if the average wholesale electricity price received is greater than LRMC over the 














Figure  10  -  Interactions  between  electricity  market  and  policy  instruments 
(reproduced with minor modification from del Río González 2007, 1373)   29 
times  of  operation  (peak,  shoulder,  etc.).   In  evaluating  whether  to  invest  in  a  new 
generation plant, firms will make use of techniques such as the levelised cost of each unit 
of electricity generated (ie, $/MWh) (Foxon et al. 2007, 45). Levelised cost considers total 
generation over the plant lifetime (revenue) divided by the total costs of construction, 
investment, and operational and maintenance costs, incorporating an assessment of the 
interest rate, all expressed in net present value terms (Alonso et al. 2006). The long run 
average cost (LRAC) curve of a new technology is also a key  input to the investment 
decision,  representing  the  total  costs  of  production  over  cumulative  output;  LRAC  is 
discussed in section 6. 
Clearly, for all firms the trajectory of ETS permit prices over time is a key influence on 
levelised  cost,  the  decision  to  continue  operation,  and  the  form  of  future  capital 
investment. In the electricity sector, fossil fuel generators will face declining profitability 
and increasing costs as the permit price rises, while renewable generators will experience 
much the reverse. Fossil fuel generators may well be forced to cease operation of existing 
plants  that  cannot  accommodate  progressively  more  severe  emission  constraints 
substantially before end of plant life. 
Renewable generators of course receive the additional REC revenue stream under MRET, 
and this will be taken into account for any decision to enter the market. On balance a firm 
would invest in renewable energy technology if the combined revenue from wholesale 
electricity market sales and REC prices meet or exceed projected LRMC for the plant 
lifetime.  
revenue ($) = wholesale electricity receipts ($EL/MWh) + REC price ($REC/MWh) 
 
Investment  decisions  would  also  have  to  take  into  account  that  such  projects  can  be 
expected  to  continue  operation  once  the  expanded  MRET  begins  to  wind  down  from 
2020 and REC revenue is hence removed. Secondly, as REC prices are subject to demand 
and  supply  interactions,  REC  revenue  is  potentially  volatile  if  the  expanded  MRET 
induced some form of overbuild in renewable generation. And crucially, any investment 
decision  must  also  take  into  account  the  effective  REC  price  cap  represented  by  the   30 
$40/MWh shortfall charge: as this is not indexed, the cap is in effect progressively falling 
in real terms, making REC revenue increasingly marginal and a declining factor in the 
investment decision. 
The decision to invest in new renewable energy projects therefore depends on the net 
effect of complex interactions between declining technology costs, wholesale electricity 
prices, and the REC revenue stream, all operating within the overarching ETS.  
 
5.5  Least cost 
A key objection to the simultaneous operation of MRET and an ETS is that abatement no 
longer occurs at economic ‗least cost‘. This is implicit in Garnaut‘s (2008b) criticisms, 
and the entire purpose of the CRA International report (2007) mentioned in section 4.4.1. 
Yet  modelling  of  a  complementary  measure  very  similar  to  MRET14  by  McLennan 
Magasanik Associates (2007a) actually found that under certain conditions the outcome 
could be a net benefit to the economy, especially over the long term. 
The question of least cost is highly sensitive to the timeframe. A policy environment that 
may cause higher costs in the short term may result in greatly reduced costs in the long 
term. Incremental improvements to existing fossil fuel technologies may well turn out to 
be  good  money  after  bad  once  the  emissions  cap  inevitably  tightens.  Stimulating 
structural change to renewable energy alternatives through MRET causes the necessary 
investments  to  begin  earlier,  which  in  turn  leads  to  faster  declines  in  capital  costs 
(McLennan Magasanik Associates 2007a, 38, 44). It also tempers an overly narrow focus 
on short term abatement at least cost that ‗may be suboptimal in the long term if these 
reductions result in locked-in use of carbon-intensive technologies for the next decade‘ 
(Hepburn 2007, 384); see section 6.3. 
Moreover, least cost of abatement is not the only factor to consider. Renewable energy 
technologies also engender a range of other benefits beyond those recognised within the 
ETS.  Displacing  coal,  for  example,  has  benefits  from  reduced  local  pollutants; 
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socioeconomic gains in development, employment, and investment; reduced fossil fuel 
dependency and energy security risks (del Río González 2007, 1372). Many studies have 
highlighted  the  net  benefits  in  health  and  environmental  integrity  in  a  shift  to 
renewables,  including  dramatically  less  water  consumption  in  both  coal  mining  and 
thermal plant operation — a positive that should not be overlooked in the context of an 
Australia adapting to now-unavoidable climate change impacts. Analysis of renewable 
energy‘s benefits in Australia show significantly greater job hours per unit of electricity 
generated  (see  for  example  Diesendorf  2005;  MacGill  et  al.  2002),  and  ‗vast‘  export 
potential for indigenous technologies and services that would be developed in any serious 
effort to harness Australia‘s abundant renewable energy resources (McLennan Magasanik 
Associates 2006b). Overall net job gains are even projected from an assisted transition 
away from coal in areas such as the Hunter Valley (Bill et al. 2008). The policy objectives 
underlying both the ETS and MRET, and the sociopolitical context of which they are a 
part, are then greater than somewhat reductionist assessments of economic least cost. 
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6  Structural change toward decarbonised electricity 
generation 
6.1  Can the ETS alone stimulate structural change? 
The  2006  Stern  Review  explicitly  states  that  ‗[c]arbon  pricing  alone  will  not  be 
sufficient  to  reduce  emissions  on  the  scale  and  pace  required...‘  (emphasis 
added, Stern 2006, 346): support for R&D and early stage commercialisation investments 
for new technologies is also necessary, as well as addressing other barriers to entry. The 
ETS — a price on carbon — is necessary but not sufficient to stimulate the structural 
change toward decarbonisation urgently required, especially in the energy sector. As well 
as addressing specific market failures such as the positive externality of research or the 
first-mover  disadvantage  and  natural  monopoly  characteristics  of  electricity 
infrastructure,  other  complementary  policies  are  called  for.  This  view  is  echoed  in 
various ways by a range of other authors (such as Healy and Kuch 2008; Foxon et al. 
2007; Outhred and MacGill 2003; Sonneborn 2004; del Río González 2007). 
In essence, the ETS will not operate under conditions of ceteris paribus. All else is not 
equal because renewable energy technologies are not competing against fossil fuels from 
the same starting point: fossil fuel technologies are the incumbent dominant design, and 
a carbon price alone does not address the power and the inertia of this incumbency. 
To understand why this is so, we need to appreciate the innovation chain of technology 
development and progression to market competitiveness. 
 
6.2  The Innovation Chain 
In  one  of  three  reports  commissioned  by  the  Garnaut  Review  on  the  subject  of 
innovation,  Foxon  et  al.  (2007)  provide  a  compelling  overview  of  innovation  systems 
theory and the role of complementary policy instruments in stimulating structural change 
in the energy sector.  Central to this work is the articulation of the innovation chain, a 
realisation  of  the  non-linear  progression  of  technology  development,  incorporating   33 
systemic  feedbacks  and  the  roles  of  different  interacting  actors.  Crucially,  this 
construction  recognises  the  complementary  forces  of  ‗market  pull‘,  once 
commercialisation  is  achieved,  and  ‗technology  push‘  from  policy  instruments  while 
technology is still immature. The innovation chain is illustrated below. 
 
Figure 11 - The Innovation Chain (Fig 2.2, from Foxon 2003, in Foxon et al. 2007, 28) 
 
Foxon et al. (2007) identify three key themes within innovation systems approaches (pp. 
19-21):  the  importance  of  recognising  systemic  interactions  affecting  innovation, 
including ―systems failures‖ that extend beyond economic market failures into realms 
such as institutional biases; the fact that firms always operate within the constraints of 
uncertainty and “bounded rationality”, where innovation often results from ‗learning-by-
doing,  learning-by-using  and  learning-by-interacting‘  and  innovation  is  ‗necessarily 
characterised  by  uncertainty‘  about  markets,  technology  potential,  and  the  regulatory 
environment; and the key role played by the institutional set-up in affecting the direction 
and pace of technological innovation, as institutions, and social norms and expectations 
(especially regulations and regulatory authorities) dictate the ―rules of the game‖. 
These insights, which critically stem not only from theory but a range of empirical studies 
and  observations,  indicate  that  ‗a  mix  of  policies  is  needed  to  promote  successful 
innovation,  which  goes  beyond  just  support  for  R&D  and  pricing  carbon  emissions‘   34 
(Foxon et al. 2007, 28). Specifically, and as  also described in the Stern Review, three 
distinct types of policy measure are necessary (pp. 29-30): 
1.  A carbon price 
2.  Direct  support  for  innovation  at  the  various  stages  of  the  innovation  chain, 
including  price  support  mechanisms,  particularly  for  renewable  technologies, 
such as feed-in tariffs (FiT) which have proven so effective in Europe, and market 
obligation systems like the UK‘s Renewable Obligation and Australia‘s MRET 
3.  Addressing other barriers to technology adoption 
The  application  of  these  measures  to  the  innovation  chain  is  illustrated  in  Figure  12 
below. 
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Figure 12 - Policy support of the innovation chain (modified from Fig 3.1, Foxon et al. 
2007, 41); note: ROCs is Renewable Obligation Certificates, analogous to MRET RECs 
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Similarly,  the  Stern  Review  previously  highlighted  the  crucial  role  that  ‗deployment 
support‘  mechanisms  play  in  complementing  a  carbon  price  signal  in  stimulating 
technology  innovation15 in the electricity sector, such as for renewables. Stern  (2006) 
makes clear that these policy mechanisms come  after the initial support given to R&D 
and demonstration, assisting development of the technology and reducing costs ‗to the 
point  that  deployment  can  begin‘  (pg.  359).  Price  support  mechanisms  are  clearly  an 
effective instance of this deployment support. The complementarity of these two policy 
instruments for innovation is illustrated in Figure 13 above — under a carbon price the 
degree of cost reduction needed to compete with incumbent technology moves from point 
A to point B. 
 
Of the three necessary policy types above, both Garnaut (2008b) and the Green Paper 
clearly recognise the need for a carbon price. Garnaut broadly recognises the innovation 
chain  and  the  need  to  address  commonly  understood  market  failures  and  barriers  to 
entry  such  as  those  related  to  electricity  network  infrastructure;  the  Green  Paper  is 
relatively weak in this regard and defers much assessment to COAG‘s working group and 
the  Wilkins  Review  of  complementary  policy  measures16.  The second measure, direct 
innovation support, is addressed in both Ga rnaut and the Green Paper but only in the 
initial  stages  of  the  innovation  chain  through  funding  for  R&D  and  demonstration 
projects.  The seminal role of  deployment support — like MRET  —  has in effect been 
overlooked  in  the  Green  Paper  in  its  deference  to  the  Wilkins  Review,  and  implicitly 
rejected by Garnaut, as  highlighted  in section  4.4.  Garnaut‘s rejection  is all the more 
remarkable considering the clear advice presented to the review by Foxon et al. (2007) in 
the paper commissioned specifically for that purpose. 
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6.2.1  MRET’s price support function 
McHugh (2006) has noted the barrier to entry for new technology represented by the 
market  dominance  of  incumbent  technology  operating  with  unpriced  external  costs. 
Incumbent producers have already realised reductions along their long run average cost 
(LRAC)  curve  through  economies  of  scale  and  economies  of  learning  achieved  by 
cumulative  production.    However,  new  technologies  must  enter  the  market  with 
cumulative production of zero, at the highest point of their LRAC curve — their entry 
price  may be well above the current  production price of incumbents and they cannot 
compete (McHugh 2006, 368-9). By policy action to internalise negative externalities, 
incumbent technologies‘ LRAC curves are moved upwards. This may result in the current 
production  price  rising  to  a  level  that  new  technologies  are  able  enter  the  market 
competitively (pg. 370). 
However, this insight can be applied in the context of the ETS carbon price acting on the 
electricity generation sector where the increased production cost for incumbent fossil fuel 
generators is not sufficient to allow new renewable technologies to enter the market. This 
may  well  occur  in  the  short  to  medium  term  of  ETS  operation,  dependant  on  the 
particular  emissions  trajectory,  regulatory  and  institutional  context,  and  the  specific 
LRAC characteristics of various fossil and renewable generators. The function of a price 
support  mechanism  like  MRET  in  this  scenario  is  then  to  guarantee  a  degree  of 
production from renewable generators17 such that they are able to move along the LRAC 
curve  to  achieve  price  parity  with  fossil  fuel  generators  and  then  compete  without 
further assistance. 
This  scenario  is  illustrated  using  the  stylised  example  of  coal  and  a  non-specific 
renewable technology in Figure 14 & Figure 15  below, derived from McHugh (2006). 
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Figure 14 - The market dominance barrier to entry even under carbon price 
Figure 15 - The role of MRET in addressing the market dominance barrier to entry   39 
Figure 14: Initially, at the current cumulative production level Q C, the incumbent coal 
generation  technology  produces  at  price  Pcoal.  The  LRAC  curve  for  the  renewable 
technology is above that of coal for all levels of production, and further must enter the 
market at zero cumulative production with price PreE. The introduction of an ETS carbon 
price shifts the coal LRAC curve upwards such that LRACcoalE is now above LRACre for 
all levels of production. However, at QC coal is able to produce at price PcoalETS, which 
remains below PreE, and the barrier to entry persists. 
Figure 15: MRET‘s price support allows the renewable technology to achieve economies of 
scale and learning through cumulative production, moving down the LRACre curve to 
level QreMRET. At this point in the curve, the renewable technology is at price parity with 
coal under the ETS (PcoalETS) and can now compete unassisted. MRET has then in effect 
lowered the entry price PreE to the same point as PcoalETS. 
 
6.3  Recognising carbon lock-in 
... [I]ndustrial economies have become locked into fossil fuel-based 
technological systems through a path-dependent process driven by technological 
and institutional increasing returns to scale. This condition, termed carbon lock-
in, arises through a combination of systematic forces that perpetuate fossil fuel-
based infrastructures in spite of their known environmental externalities and the 
apparent existence of cost-neutral, or even cost-effective, remedies. 
(Unruh 2000, 817) 
 
Recognition  of  the  carbon  lock-in  afflicting  Australian  energy  supply  systems,  and 
especially electricity generation, must inform policy making if climate change mitigation 
efforts are to be effective. Put bluntly, Australia is enthralled by coal, oil, and gas, at the 
same  time  as  our  abundant  renewable  energy  resources  are  too-often  ignored  or 
marginalised. This situation of carbon lock-in is the product of more than a century of 
deliberate and accidental, intended and incidental, government policies and government-
built infrastructure and the sociocultural norms and institutions of which they are a part. 
Complex  technological  systems  —  indeed,  systems  of  systems  —  such  as  electricity 
generation  cannot  be  understood  in  isolation  but  rather  as  ‗embedded  in  a  powerful   40 
conditioning social context of public and private institutions‘ (Unruh 2000, 818). Unruh 
(2000) describes this state as the techno-industrial complex (TIC), developing ‗through a 
path-dependent,  co-evolutionary  process  involving  positive  feedbacks  among 
technological infrastructures and the organizations and institutions that create, diffuse 
and employ them‘ (pg. 818). The interlinked and self-referential TIC serves to lock-out 
alternative technologies and, more importantly, alternative visions for the possible forms 
of society and technological infrastructure, often manifesting through a myriad of market 
and policy failures that remain ‗systematically uncorrected‘, and even exacerbate carbon 
lock-in (pp. 818, 825).  
Box 2: Increasing returns to scale 
The innovation literature identifies four major classes of the increasing returns to scale referred to 
above (Unruh 2000, 820-1, citing Arthur 1994; Foxon et al. 2007, 13,19-21; del Río González 
2007, 1372): 
  Scale  economies,  wherein  production  costs  decline  by  spreading  fixed  costs  over 
increasing output volumes 
  Learning  economies,  involving  learning-by-doing  (experience  gained in  the  production 
process), learning-by-using (experience gained by subsequent use of a product), and 
learning-by-interacting  (interaction  between  producers  and  consumers  in  a 
communicative context) 
  Adaptive expectations, reducing uncertainty and gaining confidence through increasing 
adoption of a technology (applying to producers and consumers alike) 
  Network  economies,  where  interaction  among  technology  systems  and  their  users 
generates effects greater than the sum of individual parts 
 
In  this  way,  dominant  technologies  such  as  coal -fired  electricity  generation  and  its 
attendant centralised, monolithic network infrastructure, attained and retain dominance 
not  through  superior  function  but  throug h  a  path-dependent  process  reliant  on 
increasing returns to scale, based as much on historical circumstance as any sense of 
optimality (Unruh 2000, 820). Path-dependence expresses the realisation that dominant 
technologies‘  success  depends  on  the  path  taken  in  their  development  and  diffusion, 
including the character of initial markets, institutional and regulatory context, and social   41 
expectations (Foxon et al. 2007, 11). Sonneborn (2004) observes the lock-in of fossil fuel 
electricity  generation  can  in  part  be  ascribed  to  its  cost  reductions  from  a  ‗long 
production  history‘  and  ‗extensive  infrastructure  of  fuel  supply‘,  noting  that  this 
dominance was established while negative social costs were not recognised (pg. 1800). 
Further,  dominant  technologies  (dominant  designs)  become  embedded  within  social 
norms  and  expectations  —  and  government  institutions  —  co-evolving  in  ways  that 
entrench their dominance progressively over time (Unruh 2000, 824). A key instance of 
technological  dominance  is  the  hegemony  of  contemporary  centralised  AC  electricity 
infrastructure. This dominance arose only after hard-fought battles against competing DC 
systems in the late 19th century, where AC‘s success had little to do with its technical 
merits but rather circumstance and concerted political action; what‘s more, AC actually 
facilitated the emergence of centralised infrastructure and monopolies where DC would 
have  created  more  decentralised  and  localised  systems  (Lohmann  2006,  111;  Unruh 
2000, 821). 
 
It must be understood that the fossil fuel techno-industrial complex persists as much due 
to the sociocultural norms and institutional structures that have co-evolved with it, as to 
technology.  In  fact,  I  argue  these  non-technical  forces  are  now  preeminent.  The  TIC 
construct expresses the hegemony of a discourse in Australia that perceives fossil fuels, 
and  the  technologies  that  extract  and  exploit  them,  as  the  natural  order  of  things, 
unassailable and inviolate. 
A key manifestation of these forces is the political power and influence of the fossil lobby. 
The asymmetries of power in comparison to the renewable energy industry and allied 
environmental and social change organisations cannot be overstated. Guy Pearse (2007) 
in his book High & Dry, and Clive Hamilton (2007) in Scorcher, make clear the extent to 
which the fossil lobby has co-opted, manipulated, and ultimately prevented Australian 
attempts to begin meaningful action toward climate change mitigation; a recent closed 
door  ‗crisis  meeting‘  with  the  largest  polluters,  instigated  by  the  federal  Minister  for   42 
Energy  seeking  to  generate  more  ‗industry  friendly‘  alternatives  to  the  CPRS,  further 
highlights the power of these groups (Milne 2008b). 
These same perspectives are rife within the Green Paper and the  Garnaut  Review, as 
highlighted in sections 4.3 and 5.5. The massive bias in favour of ‗technofixes‘ such as 
CCS in the contemporary Australian political discourse is fundamentally an expression of 
the carbon lock-in worldview that, as Lohmann (2006) observes in his critique of carbon 
trading, seeks to ‗allow continued exploitation of coal, oil and gas‘ , anything to avoid 
actually reducing and finally ceasing their use (pp. 43-4). 
 
6.4  The policy approaches needed to overcome carbon lock-in 
In  recognising  the  existence  of  carbon  lock-in  and  the  imposing  barrier  to  effective 
structural  transition  toward  a  decarbonised  energy  system  represented  by  its  techno-
industrial complex, policy makers also open the possibility for overcoming it. As Unruh 
(2002) notes in a subsequent paper, we must not conclude that the ‗current quasi-stable 
equilibrium is a permanent feature‘ — changes can and do occur, and the limiting factors 
are  predominantly  institutional  and  organisational,  not  of  science  or  technology  itself  
(pg. 318). 
Following from the innovation chain discussion in section 6.2 above, Foxon et al. (2007) 
distil three guiding principles for fostering structural change (pp. 58-9): 
1.  The  fundamental  need  for  a  stable,  long-term  strategic  framework  for  the 
transition to a low-carbon economy, including incentives for a diverse range of 
technologies 
2.  The  key  role  of  the  innovation  chain  approach  to  identify  policy  instruments 
suited for different stages of technology development 
3.  Policy  instrument  flexibility  over  time,  within  the  overarching  strategic 
framework 
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Within this framework, the ETS carbon price signal  underpins all other policies applied 
at  the  various  stages  of  the  innovation  chain,  such  as  MRET‘s  price  support.  When 
designed  properly  these  are  complementary,  not  conflictual.  The  ETS  becomes  the 
primary  policy  mechanism  once  technologies  are  suitably  mature  and  can  compete 
against dominant fossil fuel technologies without further assistance (Foxon et al. 2007, 
pp. 3, 30, 55). 
 
Unruh (2002) identifies that attempts to induce structural change broadly follow two 
policy  approaches:  continuity,  replacing  certain  components  within  the  underlying 
system; and discontinuity, replacing the entire system through ‗radical change‘ (pp. 318-
20). Individual technology options can be applied in both continuous and discontinuous 
ways.  Renewable  energy  technologies  could,  for  example,  be  applied  in  a  continuous 
fashion  where  they  replace  fossil  fuel  plant  but  remain  within  the  centralised 
infrastructure  paradigm;  or  they  could  form  the  basis  for  a  new  and  discontinuous 
decentralised,  localised  energy  infrastructure,  where  ‗learning  and  mass  production 
economies would substitute for the brute scale economies of large generation plants‘ (pg. 
320).  This underscores the fact that it is not  only technology  but rather the  TIC that 
maintains  carbon  lock-in.  Further,  whether  a  change  is  continuous  or  discontinuous 
depends on the scale of the system level being examined. An overall continuous change 
can at the same time be discontinuous for powerful subsectors, who may attempt to block 
policy  action.  Importantly,  attempts  to  maximise  continuity  so  as  to  avoid  or  reduce 
resistance to change, risk delivering lower short term costs through solutions that are 
sub-optimal in the long term, resulting in greater overall costs (pp. 319-20). 
Effective policy to achieve discontinuous solutions to climate change can therefore only 
be realised once the fossil fuel TIC lock-in has been overcome: this becomes the ‗major 
precondition‘ for such structural change (Unruh 2002, 320). Unruh (2002) notes that 
this is a little explored area, but that evidence suggests some form of major crisis within 
the existing institutional configuration is needed, likely stemming from exogenous forces. 
The  problem  is  ‗really  one  of  overcoming  collective  action  challenges,  which  are   44 
exacerbated  by  techno-institutional  lock-in...,  and  establishing  a  countervailing 
consensus  for  policy  action ‘  (emphasis  added,  Unruh  2002,  321).  Two  important 
potential sources of exogenous influence are the technological (where new technologies 
are  able  to  exploit  sheltering  ‗niche‘  markets)  and  the  social  or  institutional  (slow-
changing  institutions  may  need  to  be  compelled  by  social  movements,  and  perhaps  a 
triggering environmental event) (pp. 320-3). 
 
These insights give new perspective to the role of the ETS and the MRET. The ETS itself 
can reasonably be regarded as neutral with respect to fostering discontinuous structural 
change — its principal function is to price the negative externality of GHG emissions, it 
does  not  directly  entrench  nor  challenge  locked-in  technologies.  However,  the  TIC 
context within which the ETS is implemented is crucial to its ultimate outcome. MRET 
serves to directly challenge carbon lock-in by forcing the diffusion of renewable energy 
technologies  in  the  energy  system.  But  this  challenge  will  not  necessarily  cause 
discontinuous change, as it is entirely possible, even likely, that 20% of electricity supply 
from  renewables  will  be  accommodated  within  the  existing  centralised  infrastructure 
paradigm; that is, an overall continuous technological change may result. The eventual 
outcome then, depends on the galaxy of policies and sociocultural norms that surround 
and suffuse our energy systems — it is as much a question of political choice of the future 
form  of  those  systems  as  the  outcome  of  individual  instruments  such  as  the  ETS  or 
MRET. 
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7  Policy-making is a political decision 
7.1  Policy under precaution 
There is  insufficient attention paid to the uncertainty and risk in achieving necessary 
environmental  outcomes  in  the  current  Australian  political  discourse  surrounding 
emissions  trading.  This  applies  to  both  the  limited  vision  of  alternative  technological 
paths from within the blinkered carbon lock-in worldview, and to faith in the efficacy of 
an ETS, which remains a largely unproven market solution. As Healy and Kuch (2008) 
observe,  the  current  discourse  ‗reproduces  the  naïve  and  apparently  unshakable 
confidence in technological and market ―solutions‖ that brought about climate change 
and other, similarly ―diabolical‖, policy problems in the first place‘ (pg. 3)18. 
This lack of attention to uncertainty is especially prevalent in discussion of the potential 
of CCS, most poignantly in the Green Paper. The uncertainties and risks inherent in CCS 
technologies are not properly recognised.  In particular, continued use of coal and gas 
within a CCS regime is implicitly assumed to be equivalent to the use of genuinely low-to-
zero emissions technology such as renewable energy. Conflating the absence of emissions 
with their ‗capture‘ and permanent ‗storage‘ is an artifice. To do so simply ignores the risk 
that storage may fail and conveniently equates emissions‘  uncertain confinement with 
quite-certain non-existence. 
7.1.1  The uncertainty and risk of CCS 
CCS is technologically complex, unproven, and highly uncertain; it may never work at all 
on sufficient scale, let alone at acceptable cost  or in the timeframes required  (see for 
example Saddler et al. 2004; Diesendorf 2006; Wilkenfeld et al. 2007; Rochon 2008). 
Even recent Treasury modelling does not project CCS deployment before  2026 at the 
absolute earliest (Australian Federal Treasury 2008, 179). The over-reliance on the mere 
possibility of CCS becoming viable is seriously unwise climate change mitigation policy. 
Yet the most insidious feature of CCS is the act of geosequestration itself. The storing of 
CO2  in  geological  structures  and  aquifers  imposes  a  permanent  liability  on  future 
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generations in the form of a permanent risk of storage failure. Even if the probability of 
such a failure is very low, the impacts may be very large indeed. In a future world of 
internationally agreed severe emission constraints, the failure of a geosequestration site 
and consequent CO2 pulse release could have grave environmental and cost implications. 
This  liability  is  largely  an  unrecognised  and  unpriced  cost  in  the  current  political 
discourse.  Indeed,  attempts  to  create  ostensibly  ‗world  first‘  Australian  legislation 
facilitating CCS have failed to address the core question of liability in the event of storage 
failure — the implication is that the tax payer assumes this burden (Milne 2008a). 
The unavoidable fact is that the continued use of fossil fuels categorically involves the 
production  of  GHGs  in  some  form,  and  no  amount  of  investment  or  subsidy  in  CCS 
technologies can ever completely neutralise this  reality nor remove the risk of failure. 
Conversely, renewable technologies produce no GHGs at point of use and very little in 
their life cycles; no GHGs are inherently produced in life cycle.  
Sound  policy  should  properly  incorporate  these  risks  through  a  full  rendering  of  the 
Precautionary Principle. 
7.1.2  The Precautionary Principle 
The  Australian  Intergovernmental  Agreement  on  the  Environment,  made  in  1992 
between the Commonwealth and all States and Territories, obliges parties to be guided by 
a  range  of  principles  in  the  formation  of  policy.  One  of  these  is  the  Precautionary 
Principle: 
§ 3.5.1 precautionary principle - 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage, lack of 
full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to 
prevent environmental degradation. In the application of the precautionary 
principle, public and private decisions should be guided by: 
i. careful evaluation to avoid, wherever practicable, serious or 
irreversible damage to the environment; and 
ii. an assessment of the risk-weighted consequences of various options. 
(Australian Government 2007) 
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The Principle is commonly understood as the imperative ‗to remove uncertainty as an 
obstacle  to  addressing  potential  environmental  and  health  hazards‘  (Weier  and  Loke 
2007, 1). In the context of climate change the imperative was to act to mitigate potential 
damage despite significant scientific uncertainties. However, the Principle also articulates 
a more nuanced need to carefully evaluate the implications of potential options for action. 
That is, we must weigh ‗the potential costs and benefits to society of each alternative 
course of action‘ (Weier and Loke 2007, 5). Precaution should inform the selection of 
particular actions as much as providing the impetus to act in the first place. 
7.1.3  MRET balances the risk and enhances certainty 
MRET serves to balance the risk inherent in CCS and the continued use of fossil fuels by 
forcing  diversification  of  electricity  supply,  creating  and  maintaining  other  options. 
Furthermore, in mandating inherently low-to-zero emission technologies MRET ensures 
a  significant  degree  of  structural  change  toward  sustainable  alternatives,  thereby 
enhancing  the  certainty  of  achieving  necessary  abatement  outcomes.  Should  these 
changes ultimately result in greater net social costs than would otherwise have been the 
case under an ETS alone — and that outcome is far from certain — the additional cost can 
be regarded as the price society pays for this enhanced certainty of outcome. 
This perspective is illustrated in the following figures depicting stylised scenarios of net 
social costs over time19 from an ETS alone (red curve) and a simultaneous MRET and ETS 
(blue curve). 
 
It is important to note that none of these scenarios represent the currently -unpriced 
permanent liability of geosequestration discussed above. 
                                                             
19 I have not specified any timeframe but these would be well into the 21

















Figure 16 - Social costs over time – CCS works 
Figure 17 - Social costs over time – CCS is costlier than expected   49 
Figure 16: In this scenario CCS technology is found to work effectively and at acceptable 
cost. With full hindsight the social costs of MRET (area  M) are substantially higher than 
an ETS alone (area E). However, the additional cost to society is politically acceptable as 
the price of enhanced certainty of abatement outcomes. 
Figure 17: In this scenario CCS technology is found to work but with more complexity and 
at greater costs than anticipated. It is unclear if the social costs of MRET (area M) are 
higher or lower than an ETS alone (area E). Again, any additional cost to society from 
MRET is politically acceptable as the price of enhanced certainty of abatement outcomes, 
and that cost may well be lower in the long run. 
 
Figure  18:  In  this  scenario  CCS  technology  has  failed  either  technically  or  from 
prohibitive costs; the arrow indicates that CCS costs may even increase asymptotically. 
The social costs of MRET (area M) are markedly lower than an ETS alone (area E). So 
MRET would achieve the desired abatement outcomes where the uncertain CCS does not, 








Figure 18 - Social costs over time – CCS fails   50 
 
7.2  Reframing policy objectives 
In finally facing up to climate change, the ETS presents an opportunity to escape from 
our  state  of  carbon  lock-in.  Rather  than  the  normative  political  vision  articulated  by 
Garnaut (2008b) and the Green Paper, why should Australia not seize this opportunity, 
framing  the  mitigation  and  adaptation  objectives  in  terms  of  a  future  energy  system 
based  on  annual  solar  energy  budget  and  Australia‘s  abundant  renewable  energy 
resources? Instead of relying on CCS — the ultimate end-of-pipe technofix solution — 
why not move to genuinely address the root cause of GHG emissions from our energy use, 
to move away from fossil fuels? An alternative future broadly based on renewable energy 
could  be  truly  sustainable  where  fossil  fuels  can  never  be.  With  renewable  energy‘s 
benefits in jobs, health, energy security, and environmental impact, it is  folly to be so 
narrowly  focussed  on  coal  and  CCS.  Our  national  interest  can  lie  just  as  much  in 
renewable energy and technology services as it does in mining and exporting coal. 
Only  by  assuming  that  coal  use  must  be  maintained  can  MRET  be  seen  as  a  policy 
objective in conflict with the ETS. If our objectives are defined in terms of emissions 
abatement and a structural transition toward renewables — or at the very least an effort 
in that direction equal with CCS — then MRET is clearly complementary to the ETS. 
Moreover, we forget the uncertainties and risks of CCS at our peril; climate change does 
not permit us the time to fail in that pursuit. Garnaut (2008b) states: ‗In determining the 
preferred approach for Australia‘s mitigation effort, the primary policy objective must be 
to meet a specified trajectory of emissions reductions at the lowest possible cost (pg. 
310).‘  But  this  could  be  modified  to  recognise  the  need  for  greater  certainty  of  the 
abatement outcome, to set the primary policy objective as meeting the specified trajectory 
of emissions reductions with the necessary degree of certainty at the lowest possible cost 
this allows.     51 
8  Conclusions 
In light of the above discussion it is instructive to return now to Garnaut‘s criticisms of 
MRET in section 4.4.1, addressing each in turn: each Criticism identifier below refers to 
the original summarised in Table 1, pg. 19. 
Table 2 - Analysis of Garnaut's MRET criticisms 
Criticism  Analysis 
GR01  MRET is unlikely to drive increasingly expensive technology 
deployments simply because the non-indexed shortfall charge is an 
effective REC price cap, which places an upper bound on this 
additional revenue stream. Any renewable generation investment 
must cover its costs (section 5.4.3), and as the shortfall charge declines 
in real terms, new investment will on balance closely track the trends 
in wholesale electricity markets.  
GR02  The ETS is technology neutral but the political-economic context it 
operates within is certainly not. An understanding of the innovation 
chain and the presence of carbon lock-in makes the need for price 
support mechanisms such as MRET — in addition to the ETS price 
signal — clear and unequivocal for stimulating structural change 
toward decarbonisation. Moreover, under conditions of carbon lock-
in, the statement that fostering renewable energy and emissions 
abatement are conflicting policy objectives belies a normative bias in 
favour of fossil fuels. There is no reason why government should not 
take an explicit position that recognises the benefits and ultimate 
sustainability of renewable energy, enacting policies that at least ‗level 
the playing field‘ with the fossil economy. 
GR03  Further, it is at least possible that MRET‘s induced expansion of 
renewable energy may lead to less cost and net benefit in the long 
term. Any short term excess costs may well be balanced by markedly 
reduced costs overall.   52 
GR04  Even if the assumptions underlying such modelling prove broadly 
accurate, a range of parallel benefits to society and the economy are 
not reflected in such cost estimates. These include additional jobs and 
development in the Australian renewable industries, as well as benefits 
to health and the environment. And again, any such costs in the short 
term may result in net savings in the long term. 
GR05  No evidence or explanation for this perverse consequence (more coal 
generation) is given. The assertion seems fanciful and illogical. Even if 
displacement of gas by renewables was somehow able to allow new 
coal generation to occur — presumably through coal taking up the 
emissions ‗freed up‘ by gas — such investment would be remarkably 
ill-advised, and likely short-lived, within a tightening emissions 
trajectory. Given their relative emission intensities (Figure 7), it is far 
more likely that more intermediate-level gas (eg, CCGT) would come 
onstream to displace coal, even while peaking gas plant was displaced 
by renewables. 
GR06  The price effects of the two policy instruments‘ interactions are 
complex and extremely difficult to determine ex ante (see section 5.4). 
With a low cap, MRET could cause strong downward pressure on 
permit prices. But as above, the shortfall charge sets an upper bound 
on REC prices, so they cannot realistically rise much farther than 
currently. What‘s more, due to the marginal generator displacement 
effect of substantial renewable generation, wholesale electricity prices 
could well fall in this scenario. The lack of other abatement activity is 
debatable, but even if true, why should this necessarily be a problem? 
When viewed over the long term, earlier structural changes in the 
electricity sector are to be welcomed. The ETS is a means to an end, 
not the objective in and of itself. And the question could be inverted to 
ask why an ETS trajectory should be ‗gentle‘ in the first place, given 
the manifest urgency and magnitude of the abatement task.   53 
An  expanded  MRET  clearly  serves  the  crucial  innovation  price  support  function 
necessary  to  allow  renewable  energy  technologies  to  realise  cost  reduct ions  through 
diffusion,  becoming competitive  with  incumbent fossil fuel generators  under the ETS 
carbon price signal.  In this way MRET will  play a key role in stimulating structural 
change toward a decarbonised energy system, ensuring GHG abatement is for the long 
term. The simultaneous operation of the t wo instruments will generate some complex 
and dynamic effects on electricity prices, the outcome of which is far from certain. Higher 
costs may be experienced in the short to medium term but may result in overall reduced 
costs and even net benefits in the long term. A range of other benefits are also driven by 
greater  renewable  energy  deployments,  including  gains  in  employment,  health,  and 
environmental impact. 
Beyond cost comparisons, MRET further provides an essential signal of intent as part of 
the long-term strategic framework needed to overcome carbon lock-in and the hegemonic 
fossil fuel techno-industrial complex. In its support for emission-free energy innovation, 
MRET helps to level the playing field against the vested and powerful interests of the 
fossil fuel industry and their lobbyists. 
And  where  the  prime  climate  change  mitigation  policy  initiatives  in  Australia  —  the 
Garnaut Review and especially the CPRS Green Paper — remain so enthralled by coal and 
the distant promise of CCS, MRET forces an early diversification of our energy supply. 
What‘s more, by fostering renewables MRET balances the inherent and overlooked risks 
in an over-reliance on geosequestration and enhances the certainty that true abatement 
will be realised. 
Perhaps  most  of  all,  the  presence  of  MRET  keeps  open  the  possibility  for  more  fully 
articulating  an  alternative,  genuinely  sustainable  vision  of  a  future  Australian society, 
sited  in  a  world  that  finally  comes  to  grips  with  the  dire  and  immediate  threat  of 
anthropogenic climate change. 
An  expanded  MRET  is  then  a  necessary  policy  instrument  and  is 
complementary to the overarching ETS carbon price signal.   54 
9  GLOSSARY 
Term / Abbreviation  Definition 
CCGT  Combined cycle gas turbine 
CCS  Carbon capture and storage, the various technologies to 
capture and then store CO2 using some form of 
geosequestration 
CO2-eq  Carbon dioxide equivalent, the standard measure of 
greenhouse gases (see below) stated in terms of the 
equivalent emission of carbon dioxide reflecting the 
actual gas‘ global warming potential 
COAG  Council of Australian Governments 
CPRS  Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, the ETS and 
accompanying policies outlined by the Green Paper 
Emissions intensity  The volume of GHGs produced per unit of electricity 
generation, expressed in tonne CO2-eq/MWh of 
electricity 
EITE  Emissions-Intensive Trade-Exposed industries 
ETS  Emissions Trading Scheme 
FiT  Electricity Feed-in Tariffs for renewable energy systems 
Garnaut  The Garnaut Climate Change Review – Final Report, 
unless otherwise stated (Garnaut 2008b) 
Gas  Unless stated otherwise or implied by context, ‗gas‘ will 
refer to natural gas as a fossil fuel 
GHG(s)  Greenhouse gas(es); unless otherwise stated these are 
the six gases covered under the United Nations‘ 
Framework Convention on Climate Change Kyoto 
Protocol (and to be covered under an Australian ETS): 
carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide 
(NOx), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), perfluorocarbons   55 
(PFCs), and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) 
Green Paper  Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Green Paper 
(Department of Climate Change 2008a) 
IGCC  Integrated gasification [of coal], combusted using 
combined cycle gas turbines 
Levelised cost  Total generation over the plant lifetime divided by total 
costs expressed in net present value; see section 5.4.3 
LRAC  Long run average cost 
LRMC  Long run marginal cost 
MRET  Mandatory Renewable Energy Target 
NEM  National Electricity Market, covering Queensland, NSW, 
Victoria, SA, and Tasmania 
ORER  Office of the Renewable Energy Regulator, statutory 
authority administering MRET 
Permit  An emissions reduction  permit within the ETS, 
equivalent to 1 tonne of CO2-eq abatement 
RE  Renewable energy 
REC  MRET‘s Renewable Energy Certificate instrument, 
equivalent to 1 MWh of renewable electricity 
RET  Renewable Energy Target, the expanded MRET 
RPP  MRET‘s annual Renewable Power Percentage  
SAI  Strong Affected Industry under the Green Paper‟s  
classification 
SRMC  Short run marginal cost 
SWH  Solar water heating 
TIC  Techno-industrial complex; see section 6.3 
WEM  Wholesale Electricity Market of Western Australia 
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